We present and discuss general techniques for proving inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms. We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems.
1 Introduction 1.1 Inapproximability Issues in Algorithmic Mechanism Design The field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design [33] deals with designing protocols for achieving global goals that require interaction with selfish agents. Algorithmic Mechanism Design combines an economic perspective that takes into account the strategic behavior of the agents, with a theoretical computerscience perspective that focuses on computational aspects such as efficiency and approximability. In most of the works in this field the very robust notion of equilibrium in dominant strategies is used. It is well known ( [31] , see [33] ) that, without loss of generality, we can limit ourselves to only considering "incentive compatible" mechanisms, also known as "truthful" mechanisms or "strategy-proof" mechanisms. In such mechanisms participants are always rationally motivated to correctly report their private information.
Let us now describe, more formally, the nature of the problems that Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to solve: There is a finite set of alternatives A = {a, b, c, ...}, and a set of strategic agents N = {1, ..., n}. Each agent i has a valuation function v i : A → R that is his private information. The agents are self-interested and only wish to maximize their own gain. The global goal is expressed by a social choice function f that assigns every possible n-tuple of agents' valuations (v 1 , ..., v n ) an alternative a ∈ A. Mechanisms are said to truthfully implement a social choice function if their outcome for every n-tuple of agents' valuations matches that of the social choice function, and if they enforce payments of the different agents in a way that motivates truthful behavior.
A very common social choice function is the utilitarian function; A utilitarian function aims to maximize the social welfare, i.e. to find the alternative a for which the expression Σ i v i (a) is maximized. Another well known example of a social choice function is the Max-Min function (based on the philosophical work of John Rawls); For every n-tuple of v i valuations the Max-Min function assigns the alternative a that maximizes the expression min i v i (a). Intuitively, the Max-Min function chooses the alternative a ∈ A in which the least satisfied agent has the highest value compared to the least satisfied agent in all other alternatives b ∈ A.
While in many computational and economic settings the social choice function we wish to implement in a truthful manner is utilitarian (e.g. combinatorial auctions), often this is not the case. Problems in which the social choice function is non-utilitarian include revenue maximization in auctions (e.g. [19] ), minimizing the makespan in scheduling (e.g. [33, 3, 1] ), fair allocation of resources (e.g. [9, 8, 30] ), etc. A classic result of mechanism design -a subfield of economic theory and game-theory (see [31, 35] ) -states that for every utilitarian problem there exists a mechanism that truthfully implements it -namely, a member of the celebrated family of VCG mechanisms [39, 11, 21] . No general technique is known for truthfully implement-ing non-utilitarian social-choice functions. In fact, some non-utilitarian social-choice functions cannot be truthfully implemented [9, 33] . Hence, from a computational point of view it is natural to ask how well these social choice functions can be approximated in a truthful manner.
Our Results
In this paper we present and discuss several general techniques for setting lower bounds on the approximability of truthful mechanisms. Our techniques are powerful in the following sense: Firstly, due to their generality and simplicity they can easily be applied to a variety of problems (as we shall demonstrate) 1 . Secondly, they apply to multiparameter settings in which the agents have complex multi-dimensional preferences (and not only to singleparameter settings in which the private information of each agent consists of a single numerical parameter). Thirdly, they do not impose any computational assumptions on the mechanism (such as polynomial runningtime). Finally, our techniques apply to both deterministic and randomized mechanisms. In particular, we show how to derive lower bounds for both notions of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms -universal truthfulness and truthfulness in expectation.
In Section 2 we present our techniques and demonstrate their use on a scheduling problem. The singleparameter version of the scheduling problem has received much attention in recent years [3, 1] (and references therein). We deal with the multi-parameter version of the problem (also considered by Lenstra, Shmoys, and Tardos [29] ). This optimization problem was formulated as a mechanism design problem by Nisan and Ronen in their seminal paper on Algorithmic Mechanism Design [33] : There are n tasks 1, ..., n that are to be scheduled on m machines 1, ..., m 2 . Every machine i is a strategic agent with a valuation function v i : 2 [n] → R ≥0 such that for every task j ∈ [n], v i ({j}) (we shall sometimes simply denote v i (j)) specifies the cost of task j on machine i. One can think of the cost of task j on machine i as the time it takes i to complete j. For every S ⊆ [n], v i (S) = Σ j∈S v i (j). That is, the total cost of a set of tasks on machine i is the additive sum of the costs of the individual tasks on that machine. The global goal is minimizing the makespan of the chosen schedule. I.e., assigning the jobs to the machines in a way that minimizes the finishing time of the 1 In particular, our techniques do not involve payments (either made by the agents or distributed by the mechanism). 2 We chose m to be the number of machines and n to be the number of tasks in order to be consistent with the formulation of Nisan and Ronen. Recall, that we used n previously to denote the number of agents, whereas here the agents are the machines.
schedule. Obviously, the makespan-minimization social choice function is non-utilitarian and hence cannot necessarily be truthfully implemented by any mechanism. Nisan and Ronen prove that not only is it impossible to minimize the makespan in a truthful manner, but that any approximation better than 2 cannot be achieved by a truthful deterministic mechanism.
Section 2 illustrates our techniques by proving several lower bounds for this problem. In particular, we prove that no randomized truthful mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than 2 − 1 m . This nearly matches the known truthful upper bound of 7 4 for the case in which there are only 2 machines [33] (a non-truthful FPTAS exists for this case [23] ). Hence, randomness cannot help in obtaining approximation ratios that are considerably better than the known lower bound for truthful deterministic mechanisms. Somewhat surprisingly, this lower bound applies even for the substantially weaker notion of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms -truthfulness in expectation. This is the first lower bound for truthful randomized mechanisms for this problem. In fact, to the best of our knowledge this is the first lower bound for truthful randomized mechanisms in multi-parameter settings in general.
In addition, we show how to prove lower bounds for two important classes of deterministic mechanisms: strongly-monotone mechanisms (a somewhat similar lower bound was proved by Lavi and Swamy [27] ) and affine maximizers ("weighted-VCG"). This is another step towards proving the conjecture of Ronen and Nisan that no truthful deterministic mechanism can obtain an approximation ratio better than m.
In Section 3 we show an application of our techniques to another multi-parameter non-utilitarian problem -minimizing the workload in communication networks. This problem arises naturally in the design of routing mechanisms. We study the approximability of this problem in the inter-domain routing setting presented by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker [16] .
Finally, in Section 4 we discuss three notions of non-utilitarian fairness -Max-Min fairness, Min-Max fairness, and envy-minimization. We highlight the connections between these notions and the problems studied in this paper and prove several general results using our techniques.
Related Work In a seminal paper Nisan and
Ronen [33] introduced the field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. The main problem presented in [33] to illustrate the novelty of this new area of research was scheduling with unrelated machines. Nisan and Ro-nen explored the approximability of this non-utilitarian multi-parameter problem and exhibited a lower bound of 2 − ǫ for truthful deterministic mechanisms. For this NP-hard scheduling problem there exist an FPTAS (for any fixed numbers of machines) [23] and a polynomialtime 2-approximation algorithm [29] , that are both nontruthful.
In recent years Algorithmic Mechanism Design has been the subject of extensive study. The vast majority of this research has focused on single parameter settings (see e.g. [28, 4, 32, 2, 19, 24] ). Truthful mechanisms with constant approximation ratios were designed for the single-parameter problem of minimum makespan for scheduling jobs on related machines [3, 5, 1] . The exploration of truthful mechanisms for multi-parameter settings has mainly revolved around the problem of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions [36] , that has gained the status of the paradigmatic problem of this field. As this is a utilitarian problem, it can be optimally and truthfully implemented by a VCG mechanism. However, it has been shown that the social welfare in combinatorial auctions cannot be maximized (or even closely approximated) in polynomial time [28, 34] . As algorithmic mechanism design seeks time-efficient implementations, the main challenge faced by researchers was devising truthful polynomial-time mechanisms that approximately maximize the social welfare in combinatorial auctions ( [26, 13, 14, 7, 22] ).
There are but a few inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms. This is particularly true in multiparameter settings. Other than Nisan and Ronen's 2 − ǫ lower bound discussed previously, the following inapproximabily results are known: Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan [25] proved several lower bounds for polynomialtime truthful deterministic mechanisms. Their work necessitated making several rather restrictive assumptions on the mechanisms beside assuming that they are truthful. Recently, Dobzinski and Nisan [12] proved inapproximability results for polynomial-time VCG mechanisms. We contribute to this ongoing research by presenting methods for deriving the first lower bounds for multi-parameter settings that apply to general truthful randomized mechanisms. Our lower bounds do not require any assumptions on the running-time of the mechanisms.
Our techniques greatly rely on the work of Bikhchandani et al. [9] . They characterize truthfulness in multi-parameter settings by showing that any truthful deterministic mechanism must maintain a certain weak monotonicity property. Using this characterization [9] manages to show that while welfare maximization can be truthfully implemented in combinatorial auctions, one cannot truthfully implement the Max-Min social choice function, even in a very restricted type of combinatorial auctions. Saks and Yu [37] proved that not only is weak monotonicity necessary for truthfulness, but in convex domains it is also sufficient. The weak monotonicity property (and several of its extensions) will play a major role in our inapproximability proofs.
Independently of our work, Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and Vidali [10] , proved a lower bound of 1 + √ 2 that applies to deterministic mechanisms for the multiparameter version of the scheduling problem. This improves over the previously known lower bound of 2 proven by Nisan and Ronen.
Open Questions
• We prove lower bounds for the scheduling problem with unrelated machines (see Section 2) and for the workload-minimization problem in interdomain routing (see Section 3). In both problems, there are very large gaps between the known upper and lower bounds for truthful mechanisms (deterministic and randomized). Narrowing these gaps is an interesting open question.
• This paper did not make any computational assumptions on mechanisms. Proving (possibly stronger) lower bounds for polynomial time truthful mechanisms is a big open question.
The Organization of the Paper
In Section 2 we present our techniques for setting lower bounds on truthfulness and demonstrate their application to the scheduling problem with unrelated machines. In Section 3 we present an applications of our techniques to the problem of workload-minimization in networks. In Section 4 we discuss several notions of non-utilitarian fairness.
A Presentation of Our Techniques Via the
Scheduling Problem In this section we present our techniques. To illustrate the use of these techniques we show how they can be used to derive lower bounds for the scheduling problem with unrelated machines. Nisan and Ronen [33] exhibited a truthful m-approximation deterministic mechanism for this problem. This mechanism is basically a VCG mechanism, and can easily be shown to be strongly-monotone (see Subsection 2.1 for a formal definition of strong monotonicity). They also proved a lower bound of 2 − ǫ for truthful deterministic mechanisms that applies even when there are only two machines and is tight for this case. However, [33] conjectures that their lower bound is not tight in general, and that any truthful deterministic mechanism cannot obtain an approximation factor better than m. [33] shows that this is indeed the case for two very restricted types of truthful deterministic mechanisms.
For the case of two machines Nisan and Ronen show that randomness helps get an approximation ratio better than 2; They present a truthful randomized mechanism that has an approximation ratio of 7 4 . This result can be generalized to m machines by designing a truthful randomized mechanism that obtains an approximation ratio of 7m 8 . 3 Thus, we prove that randomness achieves better performances than the known truthful deterministic m upper bound for any number of machines.
In Subsection 2.1 we show ways of proving lower bounds for truthful deterministic mechanisms. Using these methods we provide a simple and shorter proof for Nisan and Ronen's 2 − ǫ lower bound that relies on exploiting the weak monotonicity property defined in [9] . The techniques of Subsection 2.1 also aid us in deriving stronger lower bounds for two important classes of deterministic mechanisms -strongly-monotone mechanisms (a somewhat similar result was independently proved by Lavi and Swamy [27] ), and affine maximizers ("weighted VCG"). We note, that the mechanism in [33] , which is the best currently known deterministic mechanism for the scheduling problem, is contained in both classes. We prove that no approximation ratio better than m is possible for these classes of mechanisms (thus making another step towards proving the conjecture of [33] ).
After discussing lower bounds for truthful deterministic mechanisms we turn our attention to truthful randomized mechanisms. There are two possible definitions for the truthfulness of a randomized mechanism [3, 2, 14, 33] . The first and stronger one is that of universal truthfulness that defines a truthful randomized mechanism as a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms. Thus, this definition requires that for any fixed outcome of the random choices made by the mechanism, the agents still maximize their utility by reporting their true valuations. A considerably weaker definition of truthfulness is that of truthfulness in expectation. This definition only requires that players maximize their expected utility, where the expectation is over the random choices of the mechanism (but still for every behavior of the other players). Unlike universally truthful mechanisms, randomized mechanisms that are truthful in expectation only motivate risk-neutral bidders to act truthfully. Risk-averse bidders may benefit from strategic behavior. In addition, 3 See the full version of the paper. truthful in expectation randomized mechanisms induce truthful behavior only as long as players have no information about the outcomes of the random coin flips before they need to act.
In Subsection 2.2 we prove the first lower bound on the approximability of truthful randomized mechanisms in multi-parameter settings. Namely, we show that any universally truthful mechanism for the scheduling problem cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than 2 − 1 m . This bound nearly matches the universally truthful randomized 7 4 upper bound for the case of two machines. To prove this lower bound, we make use of a general technique that is based on Yao's powerful principle [40] . Our proof for the 2 − ǫ lower bound for deterministic mechanisms (in Subsection 2.1) functions as a "building block" in the proof of this lower bound.
In Subsection 2.3 we strengthen this result by proving that the same lower bound holds even when one is willing to settle for truthfulness in expectation. Our proof relies on some of the ideas that appear in the proof of the previous lower bound but takes a different approach. In particular, we generalize the weak monotonicity requirement to fit the class of truthful randomized mechanisms, and explore the implications of this extended monotonicity on the probability distributions over allocations generated by such mechanisms.
Lower Bounds for Truthful Deterministic
Mechanisms Bikhchandani et al. [9] formally define the weak monotonicity property for deterministic mechanisms: Consider an Algorithmic Mechanism Design setting with n strategic agents that wish to maximize their personal gain. Before we present the formal definition for monotonicity we will require the following notation: For every n-tuple of agents' valuations v = (v 1 , ..., v n ) we shall denote by v −i the (n − 1)-tuple of agents' valuations (v 1 , ..., v i−1 , v i+1 , ..., v n ). Let v ′ i be a valuation function. We denote by ( 
Definition 2.1. Let M be a truthful deterministic mechanism. Let i ∈ [n] and let v = (v 1 , ..., v n ) be an n-tuple of agents' valuations. Let v ′ i be a valuation function. Denote by a the alternative M outputs for v and by b the alternative that M outputs for
Remark 2.1. This definition of weak monotonicity is for cases in which each agent wishes to maximize his value. In problems in which agents wish to minimize costs (such as the scheduling and workload minimization problems considered in this paper) the inequality is in the other direction.
[9] proves that any truthful deterministic mechanism must be weakly monotone.
Lemma 2.1. Any truthful deterministic mechanism must be weakly monotone.
Relying on the weak monotonicity property we provide an alternative proof for the 2−ǫ lower bound of [33] for the scheduling problem with unrelated machines. Our proof shows that any deterministic mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio better than 2 violates the weak monotonicity property.
Theorem 2.1. Any weakly-monotone mechanism cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than 2.
[25] presents also the strong monotonicity property. 
Remark 2.2. As in the case of weak monotonicity, this definition of strong monotonicity is for cases in which each agent wishes to maximize his value. In problems in which agents wish to minimize costs (such as the scheduling and workload minimization problems considered in this paper) the inequality is reversed.
We prove that no member of the class of stronglymonotone mechanisms can obtain an approximation better than m for the scheduling problem (even for the case of zero/one valuations). A somewhat similar lower bound was independently proved by Lavi and Swamy [27] . The idea at the heart of our proof of Theorem 2.2 is an iterative use of the strong monotonicity property to construct an instance of the problem for which the allocation generated by the mechanisms is "very far" from optimal.
Theorem 2.2. Any strongly-monotone mechanism cannot obtain an approximation ratio better than m.
A lower bound of m can also be proven for any affine maximizer (see [25] for a formal definition). Affine maximizers, also sometimes called "weighted VCG", contain the celebrated class of VCG mechanisms.
Proposition 2.1. Any affine maximizer cannot obtain an approximation ratio better than m.
Lower Bounds for Universally Truthful
Mechanisms We now present a technique for deriving lower bounds for universally truthful mechanisms, based on Yao's powerful principle [40] . Consider a zero-sum game with two players. Let the "row player"'s strategies be the various different instances of a specific problem, and let the "column player"'s strategies be all the deterministic truthful mechanisms for solving that problem. Let entry g ij in the matrix G depicting the game be the approximation ratio obtained by the algorithm of column j when given the instance of row i.
Recall that every randomized mechanism that is truthful in the universal sense is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. The "natural" approach for proving a lower bound for such randomized mechanisms is to find an instance of the problem on which every such randomized mechanism cannot achieve (in expectation) a certain approximation factor. By applying the well known Minimax Theorem to the game described above we see that an alternate and just as powerful way for setting lower bounds is to show that there is a probability distribution over instances on which any deterministic mechanism cannot obtain (in expectation) a certain approximation ratio.
We demonstrate this technique by proving a 2 − 1 m lower bound for universally truthful mechanisms for the scheduling problem. Our proof is based on finding a probability distribution over instances of the scheduling problem for which no deterministic truthful mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2 − 1 m . To show this, we exploit the weak monotonicity property of truthful deterministic mechanisms (as discussed in Subsection 2.1).
Theorem 2.3. Any randomized mechanism that is truthful in the universal sense cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than 2 − 1 m .
Lower Bounds for Mechanisms that are
Truthful in Expectation After handling the case of universally truthful mechanisms we now turn to the weaker notion of truthfulness in expectation. We start by generalizing the weak monotonicity definition to the case of randomized mechanisms. Any randomized mechanism can be regarded as a mechanism that for every instance of a problem produces a probability distribution over possible alternatives.
Definition 2.3. A randomized mechanism is a function from n-tuples of agents' valuations to probability distributions over the set of alternatives A.
The valuation function of each of the agents in such mechanisms can therefore be viewed as assigning values to probability distributions over possible alternatives rather than only to the alternatives themselves.
Definition 2.4. Let v be a valuation function. We define the extended valuation function V v as follows. For every probability distribution P over the set of alternatives A, V v (P ) = Σ a∈A P r P [a] × v(a).
Arguments similar to those of lemma 2.1 show that randomized mechanisms that are truthful in expectations must be weakly monotone (given the new definition of the valuation functions). This extended weak monotonicity is equivalent to the monotonicity in expectation property defined by Lavi and Swamy [26] .
Definition 2.5. Let M be a randomized mechanism. Let i ∈ [n] and let v = (v 1 , ..., v n ) be an n-tuple of agents' valuations. Let v ′ i be a valuation function. Denote by P the distribution over alternatives M outputs for v and by Q the distribution over alternatives M outputs for (v ′ i , v −i ). M is said to be weakly monotone in the extended sense if for all such i, v, and v ′ i it holds that:
As before, if the agents wish to minimize costs rather than maximize values, the inequality is reversed.
Lemma 2.2. Any truthful randomized mechanism must be weakly monotone in the extended sense.
We can exploit this extended definition of weak monotonicity to prove inapproximability results. We show how this is done by strengthening our 2 − 1 m lower bound for universally truthful mechanisms by showing that it applies even for the case of truthfulness in expectation. To do this, we show that the extended weak monotonicity of truthful randomized mechanisms implies non-trivial connections between the probability distributions over allocations they produce for different instances of the scheduling problem.
A key element in the proof of Theorem 2.4 is the observation that instead of regarding a randomized mechanism for the scheduling problem as generating probability distributions over allocations of tasks, it can be regarded as generating, for each task, a probability distribution over the machines it is assigned to by the mechanism. This is true due to the linearity (additivity) of the valuation functions. This different view of a randomized mechanism for this specific problem, enables us to analyze the contribution of each task to the expected makespan.
The main lemma in the proof of Theorem 2.4, namely Lemma 2.3, makes use of this fact together with the extended weak monotonicity of truthful randomized mechanisms. Lemma 2.3 essentially proves that for two carefully chosen instances of the problem, the probability that a specific task is assigned to a specific machine by M in one of the instances, cannot be considerably higher than the probability it is assigned to the same machine in the other. Thus, we show that even though allocating this task to that machine in one of the instances leads to a good approximation, any truthful randomized mechanism will fail to do so.
Theorem 2.4. Any randomized mechanism that is weakly monotone in the extended sense cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than 2 − 1 m .
Proof. Let ǫ > 0 be a real number. Consider the scheduling problem with m machines and n = m + 1 tasks. For every machine i ∈ [m] we define two possible valuation functions:
Let I be the instance in which the valuation function of every machine i is v i . For every j ∈ [m] let I j be the instance in which every machine i = j has the valuation function v i , and machine j has the valuation function v ′ j . Let T j be the allocation of the m + 1 tasks to the m machines in which every machine i gets task i, and machine j is also assigned task m + 1.
Let M be a randomized mechanisms that is weakly monotone in the extended sense. We shall denote by P the distribution over all possible allocations produced by M when given instance I, and by P j the distribution over all possible allocations M produces when given instance I j . Let R be some distribution over the possible allocations. Fix a machine i and a task j, we define p i,j (R) to be the probability that machine i gets item j given R. Formally,
We are now ready to prove the theorem. In order to do so, we prove that for every mechanism M , as defined above, one can find an instance of the scheduling problem for which M fails to give an approximation ratio better than 2 − 1 m . Consider instance I. If for some i ∈ [m] p i,i (P ) < 1 − ǫ 2 then machine i does not get task i with probability of at least ǫ 2 . However, when machine i does not get task i, the finishing time of a schedule for I cannot be less than 4 ǫ 2 , while the optimal finish time is 2. Therefore, with probability of at least ǫ 2 the approximation ratio obtained by the algorithm is at least 2 ǫ 2 . If this is the case then, in expectation, the approximation ratio is at least 2 (and the theorem follows). Hence, from now on we will only deal with the case in which for every i ∈ [m], p i,i (P ) ≥ 1 − ǫ 2 .
Let r be some machine such that p r,m+1 (P ) ≤ 1 m . Intuitively, r is a machine that is hardly assigned task m + 1 in P . We will show that in this case we can choose the instance I r to prove our lower bound. The main idea of the proof is showing that machine r will not be assigned task m + 1 in P r with probability that is significantly higher than the probability it was assigned the task in P . Thus, even though assigning task m + 1 to machine r is a smart step approximationwise, the extended weak monotonicity of the mechanism will prevent it from doing so.
Lemma 2.3. Let r be some machine such that p r,m+1 (P ) ≤ 1 m . It holds that p r,m+1 (P r ) ≤ 1 m + ǫ.
Proof. As M is weakly monotone in the extended sense we have that V vr (P )
After subtracting identical summands from both sides of the equation, assigning values, and some rearranging, we get 4 : p r,r (P ) + p r,m+1 (P r ) × ǫ ≤ p r,m+1 (P ) × ǫ + p r,r (P r ) Because p r,r (P ) ≥ 1 − ǫ 2 and p r,r (P r ) ≤ 1 we get: p r,m+1 (P r ) ≤ p r,m+1 (P ) + ǫ This concludes the proof of the lemma. From Lemma 2.3 we learn that if r is a machine such that p r,m+1 (P ) ≤ 1 m then p r,m+1 (P r ) ≤ 1 m + ǫ. Relying on this fact, we can choose I r as our instance and show that M fails to provide an approximation ratio better than 2 − 1 m for I r . The optimal allocation for I r is T r , which has a finishing time of 1 + ǫ. Any other allocation has a finishing time of at least 2. Hence, when T r is not reached by A, the approximation factor obtained is a at least 2 1+ǫ . However, we know that with high probability T r is not reached by M ; Since p r,m+1 ≤ 1 m + ǫ, and since machine r gets task m + 1 in T r , we know the 4 See the full version of the paper for detailed calculations.
probability that M outputs T r is at most 1 m + ǫ. The expected approximation ratio of M is therefore at least (1 − ( 1 m + ǫ)) × 2 1+ǫ + ( 1 m + ǫ) × 1. Since this is true for any value of ǫ the theorem follows.
Application:
Workload Minimization in Inter-Domain Routing In this section, we show an application of our techniques to another non-utilitarian multi-parameter problem -workload minimization in inter-domain routing. Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker formulated the inter-domain routing problem as a distributed mechanism design problem [16] (inspired by the extensive literature on the real-life problem of inter-domain routing in the Internet). In recent years several works that study their model and its extensions have been published [15, 17, 18] . All these works deal with the realization of utilitarian social-choice functions (cost minimization, welfare maximization), and focus on the efficient and distributed design of VCG mechanisms.
Workload minimization is a problem that arises naturally in the design of routing protocols, as we wish that no single Autonomous System (AS) will be overloaded with work. It can easily be shown that any such VCG mechanism performs very poorly with regards to workload minimization. Thus, while optimally minimizing the total cost, or maximizing the social welfare, the known truthful mechanisms for this problem can result in workloads that are very far from optimal (in which one AS is burdened by the traffic sent by all other ASes). We initiate the study of truthful workload minimization in inter-domain routing by presenting constant lower bounds that apply to any truthful mechanism (deterministic and randomized).
Formal Statement of the Problem
We are given an undirected graph G =< N, L > (called the AS graph) in which the set of nodes N corresponds to the Autonomous Systems (ASes) of which the Internet is comprised. N consists of a destination node d, and n source nodes. The set of edges L corresponds to communication links between the ASes. Each source node i is a strategic agent. The number of packets (intensity of traffic) originating in source node i and destined for d is denoted by t i .
Let neighbours(i) be all the ASes that are linked to i in the AS graph. Each source node i has a cost function c i : neighbours(i) → R ≥0 that specifies the per-packet cost incurred by this node for carrying traffic, where L i ⊆ L is the set of links node i participates in. This cost function represents the additional internal load imposed on the internal AS network when sending a packet to an adjacent AS 5 . The cost function of each node is its private information 6 . In the single parameter version of this problem an AS i incurs the same perpacket cost c i for sending traffic to each of its neighbors (i.e., c i (l 1 ) = c i (l 2 ) for every l 1 , l 2 ).
The goal is to assign all source nodes routes to d. This route allocation should form a confluent tree to the destination d. I.e., no node is allowed to transfer traffic to two adjacent nodes. We seek truthful mechanisms that output routing trees in which the workload imposed on the busiest node is minimized. Formally, let N T i be the set of all nodes whose paths in the routing tree T go through node i. Let N ext T (i) be the node i transfers traffic to in T . We wish to minimize the expression max i Σ j∈N T i t j × c i ((i, N ext T (i)) over all possible routing trees T . The problem of load minimization arises naturally in inter-domain routing as we require that no single AS will be overloaded with work.
Hardness of the Single-Parameter Case
It is easy to show (via a simple reduction from Partition) that even the single-parameter version of the workload-minimization problem is NP-hard. However, is it at all possible to optimally solve this problem in a truthful manner? The answer to this question is yes (we note that this is also the case in the single-parameter version of machine-scheduling [3] ). Lemma 3.1. There exists a truthful, deterministic, exponential-time mechanism that always finds a workload-minimizing route allocation in the singleparameter case.
Hardness of the Multi-Parameter Case
[16] presents a truthful polynomial-time VCG mechanism that always outputs the cost-minimizing tree (a tree that minimizes the total sum of costs incurred for the packets sent to to d). We begin our discussion on the multi-parameter version of the workload minimization problem by showing that this VCG mechanism obtains an n-approximation for the multi-parameter version of our problem (and hence also for the single-parameter version) in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.1. There is a truthful polynomial-time deterministic n-approximation mechanism for the workload minimization problem in inter-domain routing.
Unfortunately, it can be shown that any mechanism that minimizes the total cost (and in particular the mechanism in [16] ) cannot obtain a good approximation ratio.
Claim 3.1. Any mechanism that minimizes the total cost of the routing tree cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than n for the workload minimization problem in inter-domain routing.
Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the goal of minimizing the total-cost and the goal of minimizing the workload. It would be interesting to construct a truthful mechanism that optimizes (or at least closely approximates) the minimal workload. We present two negative results for this problem: Theorem 3.2. No truthful deterministic mechanism for minimizing the workload in inter-domain routing can obtain an approximation ratio better than 1+
Theorem 3.3. No universally truthful randomized mechanism for minimizing the workload in inter-domain routing can obtain an approximation ratio better than
On Non-Utilitarian Fairness
In many scenarios, we desire to implement a utilitarian social choice function. A well studied example of such a scenario is social-welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions. Utilitarian functions represent the "overall content" of the agents, as they maximize the sum of agents' values. This notion of fairness is but one of several that have been considered (explicitly and implicitly) in mathematical, economic and computational literature (e.g. fair allocations of indivisible items [25, 30] ).
In this section, we discuss three general notions of non-utilitarian fairness -Max-Min fairness, Min-Max fairness, and envy-minimization. We prove several general results; In particular, we show that Max-Min fairness is inapproximable within any ratio, even for extremely restricted special cases. In contrast, we show that Min-Max fairness (which is a generalization of both the scheduling and workload-minimization problems considered in this paper) can always be truthfully approximated to within a ratio of n from optimum via a simple VCG mechanism. This can be shown to be the best approximation ratio possible for Max-Min fairness (in the general case). Finally, we make use of our techniques to prove a lower bound for the envyminimization problem.
Max-Min Fairness
While utilitarian functions maximize the "overall content" of the agents, the Max-Min social choice function is concerned with maximizing the content of the least satisfied agent. Formally, for every ntuple of v i valuations the Max-Min function assigns the alternative a that maximizes the expression min i v i (a). [25] proved that Max-Min fairness in allocations of indivisible items cannot be optimally implemented in a truthful manner. In recent years, non-truthful algorithms for this problem were designed [6] , as well as algorithms that settle for restricted notions of truthfulness [8, 20] . We prove that no truthful deterministic mechanism can obtain any approximation ratio to the Max-Min fairness value. We prove this lower bound even for the case of 2 agents and 2 items. Theorem 4.1. No truthful deterministic mechanism can obtain any approximation to the Max-Min fairness value in the allocation of indivisible items. This holds even for the case of 2 agents and 2 items.
Min-Max Fairness
Min-Max fairness can be thought of as the dual notion of Max-Min fairness. It is relevant in settings in which each agent incurs a cost for every chosen alternative. While utilitarian functions minimize the "overall discontent", the Min-Max social choice function is concerned with minimizing the cost incurred by the least satisfied agent. Formally, for every n-tuple of v i valuations the Max-Min function assigns the alternative a that minimizes the expression max i v i (a).
Observe, that both the scheduling problem and the workload-minimization problem discussed in this paper, are in fact special cases of this notion of fairness. Studying Max-Min fairness in this more abstract setting enables us to state this simple observation -any Min-Max social-choice function can be truthfully approximated within a factor of n (recall that n is the number of agents) by a simple VCG mechanism. Since the best currently known approximation-mechanisms for both scheduling and workload-minimization are VCG-based, this result can be viewed as a generalization of both. Theorem 4.2. Let f be a Min-Max social choice function. Then, there exists a truthful deterministic mechanism that for every n-tuple of valuations v 1 , ..., v n outputs an alternative a such that max i v i (a) is an napproximation to the value of the solution f outputs for these valuations.
This turns out to be the best approximation ratio that can be achieved in a truthful manner in the general case. Theorem 4.3. No truthful deterministic mechanism can obtain an approximation ratio better than n to the Max-Min fairness value.
Envy-Minimization
Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi [30] presented the problem of finding envy-minimizing allocations of indivisible items. An envy-minimizing allocation of items is a partition of the m items into disjoint sets S 1 , ..., S n (agent i is assigned S i ) that minimizes the expression max i,j v i (S j ) − v i (S i ) (over all possible allocations). Intuitively, we wish to minimize the maximal envy an agent might feel by comparing his value for a bundle of items given to another agent to the value he assigns the items allocated to him. [30] proves several approximability results for this problem. The parameter considered in [30] is the maximal marginal utility. [30] shows that no truthful mechanism can guarantee a perfect solution (minimum envy). We strengthen this lower bound by showing that no truthful deterministic mechanism can guarantee an allocation that has an envy value within α from optimal. Theorem 4.4. No truthful deterministic mechanism can guarantee an allocation that has an envy within α from optimal.
